Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

NSC 12/3

Pres Rate

NSC Brief - Hagler
Sudan Elections

Cutler talks to Strauss

Presenters 10, 15

Cutler interrupts

Take up last item - JFD leaving - Radford;

Radford:

Plan - to decide war -

1 Blockade Ch naval

2 Air attk M & Canton - air LoC, cutout CC AF

3 { Ground action on line
Amphib - Wonsan & center line drive -

fixes shortcoming

If CC resume war - wd require 9-12 mo build up GC

A weapons ← quick + heavy -

Air attk on Ch, M, Kor -

X: hit where hurts most -
Peiping - if nec.

Had asked what larger systems drawn up -
if Ch attacks again, then R + X believe must consider war at once w Ch -

Cant CCs out of JC for some time to come

X I needs decl of war on Ch - how quick from Eng

JFD - Believes can use A bombs in Kor + M w/o bringing R into war -
also can blockade Ch coast - seize offshore isl.
w/o bringing R into war -
X - pursue a/c to Base

FD - fear [redacted] reaction - exposed to risk by US act
affect [redacted] to base -
Also Chang -
Also re intervention in JC + overthrow of

25X6
25X6

*NSC Review Completed *

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

get north pacific w R, Slovs on i front – as in 4/4,
Sovs get north pac w [redacted] to fight i front w Ger – 25X6
OK wasted ots of Greater Sanctions ? if it meant
E won – US wd lose E allies –
X. If we lost Ch + destroy war making pow, then
we get R in + our w allies out –
X – if this starts again – R we aren't going to fight
again while enemy comes from beyond sacred
spot – Yalu –
Q attk in i night –

W – take D's step, reappraise –
D – keep R seals off E w north pacific, then R
in w pow
R – why give CC so much cap – 300,000 into X
too tough terrain – Kaipung perimeter –
AD – it just hanging on (NIE-91)
R – reason why CC so successful is w fighting
w hand behind back –
(Refs to s/c – [redacted] in reverse case) 25X1
FD leaves

WBS in –
R – 3 US, 1 UN, 20 ROK Divs to be left in Kor –
w large MAG
D – pull 2 Divs out now for psych effect

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

statement

R - delighted

R - but can't pull up, deciding that dep Gen Jung can use A bombs

X - we'd better - wait see what we do -

H - what are we waiting for? influence Pres & halt - not move

X - let's pull out - when is a time when we can pull back garrison -

R - 20 Rom Divs ready by Feb 54, now 18

X - Retire 3/1 + 5/1 bring 2 divs home from Korea + demob - as signs we are not going to fight ground war next time -

- want be able to tell Churchill this Dec and get UK keep divs there - never did have enough

decide announce

AWD brief again

Sudan

Ho

NK integ

Gold Coast

X Very int - req memo

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5

Top Secret

NSC Agenda for Thurs 3 Dec at 10AM:

Disc I. DCI oral on Sig Devels. (Kor + SEA).

INFO II. Sec State briefing on prob devels B Conf.

Consid III Reappraisal NSC actn 962-b, NSC 152/3 papers re Mil effect relatabn Trade controls in Strat Mtls.

Consid IV NSC 151/1 Disclosure Atomic Info to Allies.

Consid V. Analysis prob courses actn Korea.

NSC Act #s 794 + 944-d; NSC 147, NSC 170/1.

oral rpts Sec St + Ch JCS on result reviews By resp orgs of the mil + dipl measures provided NSC Act # 794.

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200040002-5